The Peace Process: Communists Come to the Table

Coverage of the talks was limited to reporting of events as if they are separate from each other. News reports provided limited context and background on the issue despite its complexity being the longest running communist insurgency in Asia. Reports leave out more important aspects of the process such as the background of the conflict the parties are trying to resolve and the implications of the propositions being debated and/or agreed upon.

DURING HIS campaign, then candidate Rodrigo Duterte said that one of the first things he would do if he wins is to declare a ceasefire with the Communists and pursue anew the peace negotiations, release political prisoners and bring back Jose Maria Sison, founder and leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).

In an unprecedented political move, Duterte as president-elect invited the Left to nominate names to be included in his Cabinet. He appointed University of the Philippines professor Judy Taguiwalo to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), former Anakpawis Representative Rafael Mariano to Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and former Gabriela Representative Liza Maza to the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC).

Swiftly, the peace process got another start on June 14-15, 2016. Negotiating panels for the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the National Democratic Front (NDF) held exploratory talks in Oslo, Norway with the Royal Government of Norway as international facilitator.

To further sweeten his peace initiative, Duterte’s  state of the nation address (SONA) in July included the stunning announcement of the government’s unilateral ceasefire with the communists.  Unfortunately, just two days later, a unit of the CPP’s New People’s Army (NPA), ambushed members of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) in Mindanao.  The attack forced the president to terminate his ceasefire order.

A brief word war between Duterte and Sison followed as the latter blamed the military for having entered into guerilla area in violation of the declaration.  An exchange of hostile messages had Duterte and Sison calling each other names.

Despite the short-lived ceasefire, Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process Jesus Dureza said that the government was still willing to push through the peace talks. Sison said that the CPP was ready to move forward with negotiations.

The amenable atmosphere was boosted with the government’s reported release of 19 of the 22 political prisoners from the NDF who were going to serve as peace consultants for the formal talks. Duterte also restored his indefinite unilateral ceasefire with the Left. The CPP on the other hand declared a seven-day unilateral ceasefire.

Formal negotiations resumed as scheduled on August 20-27. Both sides agreed to reaffirm bilateral agreements made in previous negotiations. These include The Hague Joint Declaration signed in 1992, with the Left, the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG) signed in 1995 and the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) signed in 1998. The first round of talks concluded with the Left agreeing to extend their seven-day ceasefire indefinitely.

CARHRIHL is the first of the four substantive agenda outlined in the Hague Joint Declaration signed by both panels in the negotiations. It aims to promote the respect of and adherence to international humanitarian law among the forces of the CPP and the government. CARHRIHL stipulates the creation of a Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) which consists of six members—three nominated by the government and three by the NDF—which will jointly probe all cases of human rights abuses in the course of the armed conflict.

During the second round of talks on October 6-8, 2016, peace negotiators agreed on common outlines for social and economic reforms, political and constitutional reforms, and the end of hostilities and disposition of assets. Other issues discussed were the drafting of a bilateral ceasefire agreement and the amnesty for the remaining political prisoners.­

Post-script:

As winter set in and lowered temperatures in Oslo proved too much for Filipinos, the peace talks relocated to Rome. Talks began on schedule on January 19-25, this year.  Among the issues discussed was the bilateral ceasefire­. NDF chief negotiator Fidel Agcaoili stated that a bilateral ceasefire could follow the agreement on issues including the release of 392 political prisoners and the presence of the AFP in local communities. The third round of talks concluded without a joint ceasefire.

On February 1, citing the non-compliance on the release of political prisoners and the alleged violations of the military in their own ceasefire, the CPP stated that they will be terminating their five-month old unilateral ceasefire by February 10, 2017. The Left maintained however that they will continue the peace talks with the government. Both parties agreed to meet for a fourth round of formal talks in Oslo on April 2-6. Representatives of both sides dealing specifically with the ceasefire issue will meet sooner in the Netherlands on February 22-27.

What Went Before?

A little bit of history always helps.

Talks with the Left have been on and off for the past thirty years. Since 1986 over 40 rounds of talks with the Left have been conducted and disrupted over 15 times.

In 2011, after being stalled for seven years, negotiations resumed under the administration of Benigno Aquino III. Talks however could not even begin as the GRP refused to release prisoners claimed by the NDF as peace consultants covered by JASIG.

The government said that it could not release any more prisoners since the diskettes containing the photos and identification of the NDF’s consultants covered by the JASIG had been corrupted. With the failure of verification mechanism, the GRP said it was not possible to validate whether those claimed by the NDF as consultants were actually covered in the agreement. The GRP also refused the offer of the NDF to reconstitute the JASIG list. Peace talks once again returned to an impasse.

Reporting the Talks

It is difficult, if not impossible to negotiate in public. To succeed, negotiations require a measure of confidentiality. Media needs to be very familiar with the issues which will be taken up in progression as talks prosper. This familiarity will allow them to ask the kinds of questions that draw more substance out of the well-chosen words of joint statements issued after a round of talks or statements made to the media by one or the other side.

The peace process has been going on for more than four decades. Each start brings up past issues. Unfortunately, those reporting at different stages change. Almost always, the reporter for the current talks needs to get a solid crash course on the issues on either side of the table, reviewing some of the history before hoping to make sense of what is going on behind closed doors. So far, there is little evidence that reporters are well prepared to keep the public abreast of the progress or lack of it in the current negotiations between the GRP and the CPP-NDF.

Political Prisoners

The issue of political prisoners continues to be a thorn on the side of negotiators. Reports tend to rely primarily on press briefings and statements, repeating merely what have been said. Simply quoting sources without bridging gaps and checking the claims allows both parties to use media as an extension of their propaganda.

Early November, Labor Secretary and chief negotiator for the GRP-NDF peace talks Silvestre Bello III was quoted as saying that both sides were to sign a bilateral ceasefire by December. Bello also said that only the “technicalities” such as the common definitions of hostile acts and buffer zones remain as hurdles.

Days after, NDFP issued a statement that there is no imminent signing of a bilateral ceasefire and accused the GRP of “drum[ming] up false news about an impending bilateral ceasefire in order to gloss over the serious obstacles put up by the GRP to the forging of a more stable ceasefire.” In the statement, NDFP peace panel member Benito Tiamzon said that there are more serious issues to be discussed, such as the alleged violations of the military of their own unilateral ceasefire and the release of nearly 400 political prisoners, before a bilateral ceasefire can be achieved.

Reports failed to clarify either the technicalities Bello cited or the ceasefire violations Tiamzon accused government of committing.  The media also failed to explore the issue of political prisoners which the Left has consistently demanded as a requisite for an agreement on a bilateral ceasefire.

MILF and More

Prior to the tragedy in Mamasapano, Filipinos had looked forward to the passage of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) as a way to bring an end to the waging of war and a measure of a just and lasting peace in Mindanao.

The unfortunate clash derailed the passage of the law and sidelined further discussion of peace talks with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) for the rest of Aquino administration. In January 2016, then Deputy Speaker for Mindanao Pangalian Balindong declared in a privilege speech that with a “grieving heart,” he was going to “close the book of hope for the passage of the Bangsamoro Basic Law.”

But the MILF had not entirely given up hope — with a president from Mindanao who expressed not just an affinity but solidarity with the Bangsamoro. In a January 2016 interview with MindaNews, MILF chair Al Haj Murad Ebrahim stressed that there would be no renegotiation of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) with the next administration as it had already been signed. What they would do is push for its implementation, which includes the passage of the BBL.

As presidential candidate, Duterte vowed to push for the passage of the BBL. He said that he intended to make the Bangsamoro an example for the federal form of government that he has been advocating.

Duterte also drew into the limelight Nur Misuari, who was on trial for his alleged role in the siege of Zamboanga in 2013, resulting in a most destructive clash with the military that left more than 200 people dead, including civilians, policemen, soliders and MNLF members.

As the country’s foremost Moro rebel, Misuari launched the separatist movement in the late ‘60s. He has waged war against the government and has been hounded for it. His foray into mainstream politics in the ‘90s and his subsequent removal from the leadership of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) fueled intense and extensive media coverage.

The clueless coverage of Misuari’s appearance in Malacañang on November 3 was disappointing, to say the least. With few exceptions, the media reported Misuari’s resurfacing without touching on the reason for his three years in hiding, as a fugitive from the law facing charges for rebellion and “crimes against humanity.”

Misuari was a free man, at least for the occasion. Pasig City Regional Trial Court Branch 158 suspended the proceedings and enforcement of the warrants for his arrest for the next six months. The media also conveniently left this development without question.

President Duterte then arranged his transport to Manila, escorted by Secretary Jesus Dureza. The president invited the MNLF leader to speak from the presidential podium, from where Misuari proceeded to recall his role in the struggle for Moro liberation and express his support for the peace process of the Duterte administration.

Most of the news reports, print or TV, were bereft of the context and detail that the event required.

Who Is Misuari?

Not surprisingly, Nur Misuari’s connection to the 2013 Zamboanga siege was the most commonly used backgrounder in the media’s coverage. Hardly any outlet delved into the rich, violent and complicated history of Misuari, particularly, his transformation from a professor in the University of the Philippines to the firebrand founder of the Moro liberation movement and the war waged for the cause, the impact of which continues to be felt today.

Among the exceptions, Aksyon Tonite’s “EDiTORYAL” segment on November 3 aired a special feature on Misuari to supplement their reports on the rebel leader’s meeting with Duterte. The report recalled Misuari’s history as the face of the Moro rebellion and leader of the MNLF in the seventies. Also tackled were the peace pacts Misuari signed in behalf of the MNLF with two previous administrations: the 1976 Tripoli Agreement under the government of then President Ferdinand Marcos and the 1996 Final Peace Agreement (FPA) with then President Fidel V. Ramos which sought to fully implement the points agreed upon in the previous treaty.

He made more history with the signing of two peace pacts with two previous administrations.  It also recounted the breakaway of a faction which then formed the MILF.

The special traced more recent history, Misuari’s ousting by his own fellow rebels from the MNLF leadership due to the dissatisfaction among its ranks, noting the breakup of the group into factions since then, with no clear indications whether Misuari is still considered its leader.

“Misuari, the MILF and Malaysia” published by Philstar.com on November 4 also made a similar effort, also explaining Misuari’s animosity toward Malaysia.

Misuari, MILF and the Peace Process

The media’s coverage was right to report Misuari’s return in the context of the resumption of the peace process. The Duterte administration has set out to get the leadership of both MILF and MNLF on board.

On November 7, Duterte signed the executive order (EO) for the expanded Bangsamoro Transition Committee (BTC). The new BTC, presented by government panel chairperson Irene Santiago, will now be composed of 21 members. Eleven will come from the MILF, while the remaining 10 will be nominated by the government — three of which will come from the MNLF. The Misuari-MNLF faction will have a separate 5-member implementing peace panel.

However, the euphoria over having united the leaders of both groups was short-lived. In an exclusive report by CNN Philippines’ Network News on the same day the EO was signed, Misuari revealed his refusal to work with the MILF leaders whom he regarded as “traitors” and “criminals.”

This disdain goes back of course to the fact that the MILF had parted ways from the MNLF. In 2012, Misuari criticized the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) signed by the Aquino government and the MILF the same year as “a product of tripartite conspiracy.” He also claimed the FAB was a clear violation of the 1996 FPA signed by the government with the MNLF and lamented that the latter was remiss in its duty in implementing the treaty.

The Zamboanga attack in 2013 was seen as an expression of his opposition to the peace accord between the government and the MILF.

These twists and turns in the fabled career of Nur Misuari cannot be dismissed as historical trivia. The media owes the public a record of the past as the man and the MNLF exert greater influence and a place at the table in the current peace talks of the Duterte administration.