“I WILL not go to war…I will ask the Navy to bring me to the nearest boundary d’yan sa Spratly, Scarborough. Bababa ako, sasakay ako ng jet ski, dala–dala ko ‘yung flag ng Pilipino at pupunta ako doon sa airport nila (China) tapos itanim ko, then I would say, ‘This is ours and do what you want with me,’” President Rodrigo Duterte said as a candidate during the third presidential debates in April 2016.

Whether said to win the public’s vote, or in jest, as is his custom, one thing is clear: the President’s promise to recover Philippine territory from China has proven empty. In fact, President Duterte has shown the opposite: to appease, to please, to take care not to upset a foreign government which had reclaimed islands for their military use.

The previous administration gained from the UN Arbitral Tribunal in the Hague the favorable ruling that China’s aggressive, expansionist moves in the West Philippine Sea (WPS) violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights to its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). When Duterte took office as president in June 2016, it became his responsibility to follow through with a plan to check China’s expansionist spread in Philippine territory.

But President Duterte has done the exact opposite, giving China the upper hand.

He has treated China with kid gloves, adopting a friendlier stance and avoiding reference to the arbitration award during talks with Chinese officials. For Duterte, discussion of this issue was always “for another time” or “will be sometime during my term,” sound bites that added no value to the discussion of the sea row in the news.

Duterte also saw no problem with joint exploration of the disputed waters with China despite the unconstitutionality of this action, something that had been pointed out in interviews by Justice Antonio Carpio and former Solicitor General Florin Hilbay, both members of the Philippine delegation that argued the arbitration case in The Hague.

Carpio told The Philippine Star in an August 2017 interview, “Other countries can enter as contractor but not as a sovereign agreement because that is prohibited by the Constitution – the EEZ is exclusively ours. We can ask other countries if they have the technology but we don’t give up our sovereign rights because that is prohibited under our Constitution.” Hilbay, in a May 2017 column published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, called joint agreements a “Trojan horse.” He said, “Whatever economic gains there may be from any joint agreement with China over the WPS can only be made at the expense of giving away our sovereign rights over the area.”

The country’s warmer bilateral relations with China has not been without seeming benefits: tensions in the West Philippine Sea have eased, and financial aid, grants and pledges from China poured in for infrastructure, including a mega-rehabilitation drug facility in Nueva Ecija and heavy equipment for the rehabilitation of Marawi City.

But China has not let up in demonstrating its military might and geopolitical clout, even extending its exploratory activities to the Philippines’ eastern seaboard. (See: “Flashpoint in the East? Eyes on Benham Rise”)

An “Empty” Chair

The Philippines’ chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2017 coincided with the regional bloc’s 50^th anniversary. The year-round activities and meetings involved heads of state and other top government officials of the ASEAN member countries, four of them (Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Vietnam) having maritime disputes with China.

Duterte’s engagement in this milestone was met with much anticipation, a generous budget of PHP15 billion allocated. To ease the movement of foreign delegations in the city’s terrible traffic, suspension of classes and work holidays were declared with major thoroughfares in Metro Manila closed for exclusive use of official delegations involved in ASEAN-related events. (See: “Media on 31^ST ASEAN Summit”)

ASEAN is inherently a venue for multilateral discussions. As a regional concern, the South China Sea dispute occupied a prominent spot in the agenda list of media, both local and foreign. With Duterte as chair, anything he says is automatically news material.

Given the lack of press briefings and limited access to delegations, the media turned to released statements. Reports were quick to point out that the two statements of Dutere were soft on China, avoiding explicit reference to the country’s reclamation and militarization in the South China Sea but recognizing the improving relations between ASEAN and China instead.

The press also reported on the “eroded sense of trust and confidence” among ASEAN member-nations, as reflected on the joint communiqué of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers. The widely-reported reason of the delay in issuing the official bulletin last August was the apparent lack of consensus among the member-states regarding their stand on the South China Sea dispute. Broadcast and print reports also noted the silence of the communiqué on the Arbitral Tribunal’s ruling on the dispute. (See: “Reporting the ASEAN Joint Communique: The Radical Shift in PH Foreign Policy”)

Reports picked up Foreign Affairs Secretary Alan Peter Cayetano’s statement that he did not want to include in the communiqué issues that would not sit well with China, such as non-militarization and land reclamation, since China is not reclaiming anymore anyway.

The announcement of the negotiations for a Code of Conduct (COC) on the South China Sea also made headlines, but it was not sufficiently reported what this code entails. The COC has been a concept since 1992, its long history largely undiscussed in reports. As the schedule for the talks remains indefinite, there is no guarantee that China will back down on the disputed area.

Post-summit news reports online and a few public affairs programs discussed the lack of importance given to the South China Sea issue during the ASEAN meetings. Critics such as Jose Cuisia Jr., Roilo Golez, Roberto Romulo and Jay Batongbacal said in interviews that the chairmanship was a missed opportunity for Duterte to assert the arbitration ruling and gain stronger support from the other ASEAN states that have disputes with China.

Gregory Poling, director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, told Rappler in an interview, “The Philippines’ chairmanship wasn’t just a missed opportunity; it significantly weakened ASEAN’s standing on political-security matters.” Poling said it was a “real shame” that the group was unwilling to speak up for its members when they are bullied by an outside power.

Two-fold Silence

As ASEAN events unfolded in 2017, government officials speaking on the South China Sea dispute dominated the reports. The press captured the lack of a strong critical voice against China; critics and columnists provided more analysis, attributing the lack of ASEAN consensus and pushback to the conciliatory position that Duterte has taken regarding China.

Lauro Baja, former Philippine Permanent Representative to the UN, said in his VERA Files column that the true value of summits is measured not so much by what is said in formal events and statements, but by what is achieved in bilateral meetings between breaks.

But the bilateral talks are closed to media coverage.

A joint statement summarized the bilateral talk between China and the Philippines which produced 14 cooperation documents and said: “Both sides affirm that contentious maritime issues are not the sum total of the Philippines-China bilateral relationship.”

Merely relying on China’s “good faith,” the current administration has been silent on the maritime dispute. But the media have been quiet as well. Focused on the main events scheduled, news reports did not track what was happening on the ground, where Filipino citizens are directly affected by China’s defacto occupation of the West Philippine Sea.

Foreign relations and international affairs are rarely given much weight in the regular news cycle, as the impact of these on the Philippines’ national interest seems unclear to the public. When officials are silent on what the country stands to lose given this “courtship” with China, the media must stand guard, sustaining coverage with its own sources and making these a regular part of the news agenda.